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AJIJll LAW QUARTERLY[
by C. 22079, No. 19, Acts of 1943 F.S.A. Section 194.53, that after
the entry of the decree of foreclosure, all right, title, interest in or liens
on such property shall be cut off and extinguished dnd forever declared
null and void and the title to such lands when conveyed by the county
shall be construed in all respects as a new original title."
The court goes on to say that considering the- act as a whole, it
was not meant to "punish the man who makes an honest endeavor year
after year to pay his taxes as appellants were alleged to have done
in this case. Neither was it designed as a ruse to cut one loose from
a title that he was offering year after year to preserve." In so con-
struing the act, the court perhaps did do justice as concerned the
present Plaintiff, but what the court failed to consider was the vast
effect of such a ruling. What guarantee has the purchaser of prop-
erty from the county, said county having acquired title through valid
tax foreclosure proceedings, that the former owner will not come into
court and claim that he was "unlettered in the niceties of real estate
transactions"' 1 thereby nullifying the tax deed? Will title insurance
be written on any property where the chain of title has passed through
a county in rem foreclosure proceeding? In effect, the court has here
ruled that the title to such property actiuired from the county is not
a "new and independent title", 12 but one which is open to any equitable
defenses which the court may consider valid.
The effect of this decision will be far reaching unless it is reversed
or modified at some future (late. It is shocking to think that after an
equity cause is complete, absolute and final, its subject matter may be
relitigated de nova in a proceeding for a writ of possession or writ of
assistance. Attorneys should continue to litigate this question in all
parts of the state and on every possible occasion in the hope that the
court -will ultimately realize what disastrous effects such decisions
have upon real estate titles and will recede from its position.
i1 Note 1, supra.
12 F.S.A. 194.53.
FUTURE INTERESTS-CONTINGENT REMAINDERS-
I NTENT OF TESTATOR
It makes little difference whether the ultimate enjoyment of an
interest in remainder is dependent upon a cohli tion precedent or a
condition subsequent: if the right of enjoyment cannot be finallv assured
intil deterination of the particularl estate, a remainder is contingent
I "Particular estate" is a term of art used to denote the precedent
estate, consequent upon which a remainder vests In possession. "This
precedent estate is called the particular estate, as being only a small
part, or particula, of the inheritance. 2 Blackstone, "Commentaries on
the Laws of England" (1765), "164,
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and not vested. This novel statement of the law, contrary to the weight
of American authority and the heretofore controlling authority in this
state, is the result of a current decision of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida.2 It has heretofore been held, 3 that a remainder defeasible upon a
condition subsequent is a vested remainder.
In the principal case, the court was called upon to construe a will
in which the testator created a life estate in trust for his widow, and
provided that upon her death, the principal should be divided among
several named persons and a charity. The manner of division, 4 although
complicated, is not material to the decision. Testator further provided,
that if any of the named remaindermen should predecease both himself
and his wife, the gift should lapse and be divided proportionately among
the survivors. Several remaindernen survived testator but predeceased
his wife. The personal representatives of these deceased beneficiaries
claimed to share in the distribution of the estate after the widow's death,
claiming that since their decedents had not predeceased both the testator
and his widow, their legacies were not divested. The court disregarded
this contention, holding that the remainders were contingent.
The court did not discuss the point, but evidently construed the
words, "predecease both", as "fail to survive both", or "predecease
either". Where there is a patent ambiguity, as here,5 the court is at
2 Krlssoff v. First National Bank of Tampa, 32 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1947).
3 Redfearn, "Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida" (Second
Edition, 1946), 1 173. "A vested remainder may be absolutely or
defeasibly vested," citing 33 Am. Jur., 1 544. See Popp v. Bond, 158
Fla. 185, 28 So. 2d 259 (1947), noted in 21 Fla. Bar Jour. 302 (class
gift). Simes, "Law of Future Interests" (1936), § 77. Gray, "Rule
Against Perpetuities" (4th ed., 1942) HI 103, 108: "If the conditional
element is incorporated into the description of, or into the gift to, the
remainder-man, then the remainder is contingent; but if, after words
giving a vested interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder
is vested." Compare the rule, that the word, "heirs", will be construed
as relating to the .death 'of the testator in order to vest remainder.
Lowrimore v. First Savings and Trust Co. of Tampa, 102 Fla. 740,
140 So. 887 (1931). For an illustration of a condition subsequent, see
Jenkins v. Merritt, 17 Fla. 304 (1879).
4 The gifts in remainder were of two classes: specific sums to named
persons, and a specific share of what was left to named persons. Most,
but not all, of the persons named took gifts in both classes. A gift
of the first class which lapsed, passed to the second: a gift of the
second class which lapsed, was divided proportionately among the sur-
viving legatees.
s "It is a well-established rule that in construing a will, the court
may, in order to give effect to the testator's intention, construe 'and'
as 'or', and tce-versa . . . This latitude of construction is not'to be
exercised where the language of the will is explicit and the intent of
the testator is not doubtful, but only when necessary in order to suppo'rt
the evident meaning of the testator." 57 Am. Jur. I 1154. See Redfearn,
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liberty to disregard the language of the will and to adopt a constructionl
consonant with intent. 6 Accepting, however, the propriety of the deci-
sion on this point, the clause appears to be one of divestiture, and the
problem, more properly one of determining the scope and effect of a
condition subsequent.
The law favors the vesting of remainders.7 This rule implements
a broad policy hostile to restraints on the alienation of land, which also
finds expression in the rule that contingent remainders are destructible'
and the rule against perpetuities, 9 which invalidates remainders that do
not vest within a prescribed period. By construing remainders as
vested wherever possible, the court avoids the operation of these rules,
and at the same time assures the power of a remainderman to join with
op. cit., 1 130; Luxmore v. Wallace, 145 Fla. 325, 199 So. 492 (1941);
Marshall v. Hewett, 156 Fla. 645, 24 So. 2d 1 (1945); Floyd v. Smith,
59 Fla. 485, 51 So. 537, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 651 (1910). See also, Simes,
op. cit., I 363.
6 The ambiguity lies in this, that if the clause is designed to prevent
intestacy (when a residuary gift lapses, it is not shared by surviving
residuary legatees unless there is language of substitution, see F. S.,
1941, 1 731.20) with respect to any share, it is inapplicable unless the
wife also predeceases testator, which may be said to be an exceptional
case; and because the donee must always predecease the testator, it
can never operate in a case like the present. Literal constructiot would
therefore render the clause virtually inoperative, which may be sufficient
to permit the application of rules of construction. By substituting
"either-or" for "both-and", the clause becomes operative not only to
prevent lapse, but also to avoid the necessity of reopening estates to
make distribution where a beneficiary predeceases the life tenant.
7 See Story v. First National Bank and Trust Co. in Orlando, 115
Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Redfearn, op. pit., § 130; Simes, op. oit.,
£348. "The law favors the vesting of estates, and therefore prefers to
construe conditions as subsequent rather than precedent." Gray. op. cit.,
1103. See also Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28 So. 2d 890 (1946);
Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1936): Bross v. Bross,
123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936): Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 131
So. 400 (1930).
9 Popp v. Bond, 158 Fla. 185, 28 So. 2d 259 (1947); Tankersley v.
Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937): Lewis v, Orlando. 145 Fla. 285,
199 So. 49 (1940); Wallace v. Wallace, 118 Fla. 844. 160 So. :577 11935);
see Blackstone, op. cit. 1 171; Redfearn, op. cit., f 173.
9 There has been some dispute on this point, the destructibility of
contingent remainders being thought by some to satisfy the policy of
the law; but it is applicable to executory devises. Redfearn, op. cit., 169;
Blackstone, op. cit., *174; Simes, op. cit-, I 505; Gray, op. cit., 1 99,
passim. A construction is favored which avoids conflict with the rule
against perpetuities. See Story v. First National Bank & Trust Co. in
Orlando, 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Remier v. Smith, 105 Fla.
671, 142 So. 603 (1932): Maiben v. Bob, 6 Fla. 381 (1855).
RECENT CASES
the life tenant iii a conveyance. These rules have bIeen followed ill
Florida.'
0
It may be argued in the present case that it is immaterial whether
the interest of the deceased remainderman be treated as defeasibly vested
or contingent. Accepting the construction of the words "predecease both"
which the court adopted, the interest would have been defeated even if
regarded as vested. The rule that a divesting clause is to be strictly
construed" might not have led to a different result in this case. How-
ever, the ruling of the court -may cause trouble in a case where the
widow elects to take against the will,' 2 or where the divesting event
might not take place within lives in being and twenty-one years.' 3
In declaring that the intent of the testator controls the determination
whether a remainder is vested or contingent, which is undoubtedly
correctl- there is grave danger that the court will overlook the fact
that the distinction between vesting in interest and vesting in pos-
session is seldom apparent to the testator. Contingent remainders result
by operation of law from the expression of intent that the ascertainment
of the beneficiary's identity or his right to succeed the life tenant must
depend on some future event other than the determination of the par-
ticular estate 15 A remainder is vested if nothing but the determination
10 See cases cited, notes 2, 6, supra.
11 57 Am. Jur. 1 1217.
12 See Wallace v. Wallace, 118 Fla. 844, 160 So. 377 (1935).
13 See note 8, supra.
14 "In this process (construction of will) three elements are always
present. First, there is the idea in the mind of the testator, this 'intent'
so often described as the 'pole star of construction' ".
Simes, op. cit., 1 305. "These general rules all give way to the cardinal
one, that a will must be construed so a. to give effect to the intent of
the testator." Terrell, J., in the principal case. Blackstone, op cit., *379;
Redfearn, § 130. But see Gray, "The Nature and Sources of the Law"
(2d ed., 1927) 174; "It undoubtedly sounds very prettily to say that the
judge should carry out the intention of the testator. Doubtless be should,
but some judges, I venture to think, have been unduly influenced by
taking a fiction as if it were a fact. It would seem that the first ques-
tion a judge ought to ask with regard to a disputed point under a will
should be: 'Does this will show that the testator had considered this
point and had any actual opinion upon it?' . . . If this question be an-
swered In the affirmative, then there is no doubt that the solution of
the testator's intention must be sought in the will. But in the vast
majority of cases this is not what has happened." See also Gray, "Rule
Against Perpetuities", § 103, note 1.
1* "It is true, the courts frequently say that the difference between a
vested and contingent interest is a matter of intent. But, when that
statement is made, it means, or should mean, that a remainder is vested
or contingent depending on the existence or absence of an intent that
there be no conditions precedent attached to the limitation." Simes, op.
cit., 1 305.
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of the particular estate conditions the remainderman's right to posses-
sion. In either case, the estate is contingent, in testator's mind, upon
termination of the particular estate, and it is therefore a mistake to
regard language of postponement as showing an intent to make the
remainder contingent.' 6 While the court has recognized this canon
of construction, 7 it appears to have been misapplied in the principal
case.
1 8
Very little weight and much less dignity are added to the opinion
by a gratitous review' 9 of some political questions, which we had con-
sidered settled extrajudicially, vi et artnis, more than eighty years ago.
Rules of the law of property are not explained by reason, but by history.
16 "Words of postponement are usually construed to relate to the pos-
session or enjoyment of the remainder rather than to its vestinq in title
interest, and the intent to postpone the vesting of the remainder must
be clear and manifest." Redfearn, op. cit., § 173. "If futurity is annexed
,to the subject of the gift, the vesting is suspended; but if it appears to
relate to the time of payment or enjoyment only, the gift vests at once."
57 Am. Jur. 1 1220. "Nor will a remainder be contingent merely because
a testator has said it is not to vest until a subsequent period." Simes,
op. cit., 1 70. Use of words such as "distribute" and "pay" do not show
an intent to delay vesting. Williams v. Williams, 73 Cal. 99, 14 P. 394
(1887), Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal 601, 218 P. 22 (1923); Chlgizola v.
Le Baron, 21 Ala. 406 (1853); Sheet's Estate, 52 Pa. 257 (1866). See
annotation, 1915 C.L.R.A. 1012, 1064.
17 "If the element of futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift
rather than the enjoyment of it, vesUng is suspended and the gift is
contingent." Terrell, J., in Travis v. Ashton, 456 Fla. 529, 23 So. 2d 725
(1945), cited and approved in the principal case.
is The court found futurity "in substance" from the following factors':
(1) payment to the life tenant from the trust estate; (2) the will shows
on its face that the legacies of neither class vested until "after the
death of my wife"; (3) the will shows that a condition of vestiture was
that, they survive "hoth" the testator and his wife; and (4i that the
terms of the will nowhere show any obligation or desire on the part of
the testator to pay anything to the heirs or personal representatives of
any of the legatees. It is believed that the first three factors are as
consistent with delay in enjoyment as with delay in vesting, and do not
therefore compel the result that the remainder is contingent; and as
to the fourth, this is an unwarranted assumption. Likewise in Travis
v. Ashton, 456 Fla. 529, 23 So. 2d 725 (1945), the court mistook expres-
sions relating to time of enjoyment for conditions precedent to vestiture.
19 "The Jeffersonian dictum that 'all men are created equal' likewise
'scotches' the point (i. e., the contention that this was a vested remain-
der) in that it was designed to raise an American citizen to the level
of an Englishman, no one ever thought that it raised an American slave
to the level of an American merchant or planter. So it follows that legal
concepts vanish into thin air when supported by nothing more than
assumptions which are contrary to fact." 32 So. 2d 315, at 317 (Fla.).
244,
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The rules in question were old when the Great Charter was still in
its infancy; but the necessity of certainty and precision in determining
the quality of interests in property, has preserved them intact to the
present day.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE-LIMITATION ON POWER OF STATES
TO REGULATE
With the power of the federal government to regulate agriculture,
labor, industry and business under the commerce clause1 greatly ex-
panded as the result of recent decisions, z attention has been focused
upon the corresponding problem of the extent to which the grant of
power to the federal government to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce constitutes a limitation upon the power of the states.3 A
recent decision in the case of Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People of State
of Michigan 4 may serve to redefine the extent of that limitation.
The excursion company operated an amusement park upon an island
in Canadian waters fifteen miles from Detroit, and steamships by
which persons were brought to and from Detroit. No passengers were
accommodated overnight on the island or for passage to points beyond.
Officers ejected a colored girl who came aboard with a party, other-
wise composed of white girls. The excursion company was for this
reason convicted of a misdemeanor under a state statutes which forbade
denial of equal accommodations on public conveyance to any persons
because of color. Appealing from a decision of the State Supreme
Court affirming the conviction, the carrier contended that the state
statute transgressed the limitations of the commerce clause, relying
on two earlier decisions, one6 of which held a state statute requiring
equality of accommodation for colored passengers inapplicable to a packet
plying in interstate commerce, and the other" of which held a state
I U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
2 See, e.g., Wickard Fiburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed.
122 (1943); United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct.
451, 85 I Ed. 609 (1941); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters'
Association, 322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
3 See Dowling "Interstate Commerce and State Power Revised Ver-
sion" 47 Columbia L. Rev. 546 (1947).
4 68 S. Ct. 358 (U.S. 1948).
5 Michigan Civil Rights Act, Penal Code It 146-8, as amended Public
Act 117, 1937; Mich. Stats. Ann. (1946) Cum. Supp. If 28.343-6. The
text of the Act is given in a marginal note to the principal case.
6 Hall v. de Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (1878).
7 Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 66 S. Ct, 1050,
90 L. Ed. 1317, 165 A.L.R. 574 (1946).
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